The Third Command Is the Trigger

Most attacks need you to make a mistake. This one just needs you to follow instructions. 

A candidate who accepts the coding challenge runs three ordinary commands — clone the repository, change into the directory, install the dependencies: 

The third command is the trigger. The moment npm install resolves the trojanized dependency, the malicious chain runs automatically in the background — no prompts, no extra clicks, no further input required. 

From the whitepaper: the install step is the execution boundary. 

From there it moves fast. A lifecycle script spawns a hidden background process, which fetches a 3.5 MB obfuscated payload from the attacker’s infrastructure, steals browser credentials, crypto wallets, files, and clipboard data, and opens a remote shell. 

Here’s the reframe every security team needs: dependency installation is code execution. We treat npm install — or pip, or any package manager — like flipping a light switch. It isn’t. It runs arbitrary code from third parties, on a developer machine that usually holds keys, tokens, and production access. 

That’s why the fix isn’t “don’t make mistakes.” You can’t train people out of doing their jobs. The fix is structural: run untrusted code where it can’t hurt you. Coding challenges and unknown repositories belong in disposable VMs or containers, never on the workstation that holds your credentials and client data. Pin dependency versions, review what you’re pulling in, and use tooling that flags newly published or low-reputation packages before they ever reach a machine. 

There is no step three. By the time the install finishes, it’s already too late. 

 

Go deeper 

Part 4 of the series. For the full execution chain and indicators of compromise, read the LMG Security whitepaper at LMGsecurity.com (Resources), and hear Tom and Sherri on the Cyberside Chats episode, “Damaged Goods.”